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Konstan has been lecturing and publishing regularly and increasingly on ancient Greek 
emotions for at least the last fifteen years.  This book is a natural culmination in which, 
with considerable success and panache, he develops that work into a coherent whole.  
The book begins with an extensive introduction outlining the major modern controversies 
in emotion studies.  One of the most important is whether emotions should be considered 
universal or culturally specific.  K. argues that, while in general there is much overlap 
between individual emotion terms in ancient Greek and modern English, because 
emotions are based on a way of looking at the world, ultimately the parameters of an 
emotion must be unique to a culture.  He makes an instructive comparison with colour 
words: the Greeks would have had the same visible spectrum as us, but they described 
those colours differently – for instance, we might variously translate glaukos as ‘blue-
green,’ ‘pale blue,’ or ‘gray’.  Similarly, Aristotle splits our anger into two Greek 
emotions (orgê for response to a slight, to nemesan for response to an injustice), but 
collapses our shame and guilt into a single concept.  K.’s approach is fundamentally 
philological: he insists throughout that, instead of assuming ancient Greek emotions map 
easily onto their modern English equivalents, one must examine carefully the boundaries 
of the Greek terminology used. 
A parallel controversy is the dispute between what K. terms ‘neo-Darwinists’ and 
‘cognitivists’ on the nature of emotions.  Following the work of Darwin in the late 
nineteenth century, ‘neo-Darwinists’ focus on the reflex responses (e.g. facial expression, 
flushing) that express an emotion.  The ‘cognitivist’ approach dates from the 1970s, with 
scholars overturning the post-Cartesian opposition between reason and emotion, arguing 
instead that emotions are best understood as judgments based on cognitive evaluations.  
K. argues that these schools of thought are not irreconcilable, as an emotion is made up of 
both stimulus and response, while each school concentrates on only one.  However he 
firmly aligns his own work with the ‘cognitivists’, though arguing with Aristotle that 
judgements are “strongly conditioned by the social environment” (p22), and that, at least 
in the archaic and classical periods, ancient Greek emotions are best understood as 
“responses … to actions, or situations resulting from actions, that entail consequences for 
one’s own or others’ relative social standing.” (p40). 
This emphasis on the socially reactive aspect of emotions pervades and informs the 
remaining eleven chapters, respectively on: anger; satisfaction; shame; envy and 
indignation; fear; gratitude; love; hatred; pity; jealousy; and grief.  The book is mainly 
concerned with the emotions Aristotle gives socio-psychological analyses for in the 
Rhetoric (though for expository reasons they are discussed in a different order).  The 
greater part of each chapter contains a detailed, and consistent, analysis of the phenomena 
Aristotle deals with, and the vocabulary used to describe them.  K. is highly sensitive to 
nuances of different words used to express subtly different concepts.  The chapters 
typically go on to compare K.’s interpretation of Aristotle’s emotions with their depiction 
in a wide range of Greek literature, especially in Homer, tragedy, oratory, and Hellenistic 
philosophy. There is insufficient space in this review to discuss all eleven chapters, but a 
subset will be representative. 
K. argues against the usual translation of ‘kindness’ for the emotion discussed in Rhet. 
2.7, on the grounds that for Aristotle an emotion can only be a reaction to a cognitive 
stimulus, not a general disposition.  He demonstrates persuasively that the emotion 
treated is not kharis (best translated ‘favour’ or ‘benefaction’, rather than ‘kindness’), but 
kharin ekhein, or ‘gratitude’ for a favour rendered; kharizesthai and akharistein at the end 
of Aristotle’s chapter are respectively translated ‘doing favours’ and ‘acting 
ungratefully’. 
K.’s proposition that ‘satisfaction’ is a more appropriate translation of praotês than the 
traditional ‘calming down’, is less persuasive.  He argues that Aristotle’s system leaves 
scope for “a pleasurable response to a gesture that enhances one’s status or self-esteem” 
(p89), as an opposite to anger being a painful response to a slight; whether or not there is 
such scope, it is not clear that praotês is that emotion – ‘satisfaction’ works well for some 
parts of Rhet. 2.3, but ‘calming down’ better for others.  In any event (as K. notes 
elsewhere), the opposite of a pain is not consistently a pleasure in Aristotle: pity is a 
response to someone’s undeserved bad fortune, and indignation a response to their 
undeserved good fortune; these emotions are described as opposites, but both are painful.  
Aristotle’s ‘system’ does not seem quite as neat as K. might like. 
K. devotes one chapter to Aristotle’s two emotions to nemesan (‘indignation’) and 
phthonos (‘envy’).  He argues that the interpretation of the archaic nemesis as an 
indignant response to a rupture of social norms, fell in the classical period within the 
(wider) purview of phthonos.  As K. demonstrates, nemesis is barely used in the classical 
period outside Aristotle, who resurrected it to describe justified indignation.  However the 
usual oratorical word for this is orgê; only occasionally is it called phthonos.  This is a 
rare instance in which Aristotle shows himself significantly out of sympathy with 
contemporary literary usage. 
K.’s case that the modern English and ancient Greek repertoires of emotions are not 
wholly in sync, is most effectively demonstrated by his chapter on jealousy, an emotion 
Aristotle does not treat.  It becomes clear that this is because the emotion, as we 
understand it, did not even exist in ancient Greece.  Greeks could express an emotion 
representing a desire for exclusivity within a sexual relationship, an emotion that could be 
termed zêlotypia from the fourth century BCE; but K. painstakingly demonstrates that the 
Greeks (whether Hera, Medea or Eratosthenes’ murderer) did not feel pain at the 
alienation of someone’s affection.  K. speculates that such an emotion was not possible 
until women had equal status to men, and equal right to a chronic emotional attachment; 
accordingly an emotion similar to our jealousy does not appear in ancient literature until 
the odes of Horace.  This is K.’s strongest, and most thought-provoking, challenge to our 
tendency to think of our own emotional repertoire as natural and universal. 
This book is a pleasure to read.  K. is never less than informed and incisive, and never 
afraid to be iconoclastic.  He is clearly highly familiar with both the wide variety of 
ancient and medieval commentary on the emotions, and the modern, multi-disciplinary 
explosion of scholarship in the field, especially in the last thirty years, and this emerges 
most clearly in the copious endnotes (referring to scholarship in at least seven languages), 
and extensive bibliography.  This reviewer missed a chapter on zêlos (a curious 
omission), and wondered whether chapters on jealousy and grief were included mainly 
because the author had something valuable to say (it is unclear why these should be 
singled out from all the emotions Aristotle does not treat).  But these are minor quibbles 
about a major intellectual achievement.  This book is a ‘must read’ for any classicist (and 
indeed non-classicist) interested in the emotions, and no serious scholar in the field will 
want to be without a copy on their shelves. 
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